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1. Introduction 
The achievement of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) will require all hands on deck. It will require different sectors 
and actors working together in an integrated manner by pooling financial resources, 
knowledge and expertise (UN, 2018a). 
 
The current development paradigm strongly emphasizes partnerships between governments 
and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). In Africa there is generally still a lot of work 
left to achieve the SDGs  (Swaney, 2016). The only goal that is at least partially achieved in 
most African countries is number seventeen: “Strengthen the means of implementation and 
revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development” (UN, 2018b). Although 
partnerships are only recently included as a formal SDG, the trend of greater interaction 
between governments and NGOs is not a recent phenomenon (Jennings, 2015, p. 324).   
The increasing number of partnerships can be understood through the concept of 
complementarity. The weaknesses of governments complement well with NGOs’ strengths 
and vice versa (Salomon & Toepler, 2015, p. 2169). Government-NGO partnerships therefor 
seem only logical. The ‘naturalness’ of partnerships between NGOs and governments 
assumed in this perspective is highly critiqued in the literature. In the 1980s NGOs were 
introduced as official development partners, and claimed to be more efficient, effective and 
flexible than governments. NGOs started receiving large amounts of official aid. The 
introduction of official aid in the NGO arena however led to competitiveness between NGOs 
and to a “behavioural shift” towards efficiency, professionalization and target reaching, rather 
than public advocacy functions (Fowler, 2016, p. 572). NGOs were no longer exclusively 
accountable to communities, but became accountable towards donors.  
This “behavioural shift” is however not equal across all NGOs. According to Banks, 
Hulme and Edwards (2014, p. 709), membership-based, or local NGOs are less affected by 
the pressures that professional international NGOs face. They have stronger linkages with 
civil society, because they are accountable to their members and can therefor form a 
countervailing power. This distinction of NGOs based on their level of operation has not been 
included in existing models of NGO-government relations. Although some models 
acknowledge that neither NGOs nor governments are monolithic (Najam, 2000, p. 382; 
Young, ; Coston, 1998, p. 363), they do not distinguish between certain types of NGOs. I 
argue that the type of NGO, based on their level of operation, matters for the relation between 
NGOs and governments in a specific context, and especially in the African context. 
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The current literature on government-NGO relations generally focuses little on African 
cases (Bawole & Hossain, 2015, p.2063). The levels of origin are however likely to matter 
most in the African context, because of the high NGO activity from both international and 
local NGOs in the area. The context of this research is Malawi, which is one of the poorest 
countries in the world (ranked 170/188 by the UNDP (2018)). The country has over 500 
active, legally registered NGOs and approximately another 5000 illegal NGOs (Face of 
Malawi, 2013). Despite the large NGO activity in the country, little research on the NGO-
government relations has been conducted. The main research question is: “How does the level 
of operation of an NGO affect the government-NGO relation in Malawi?” By comparing one 
international NGO, the Malawian Red Cross Society (MRCS) and one membership-based 
NGO, the ‘Eagles’ Relief and Development (‘Eagles’), this research question will be 
answered. The level of analysis of this research is the food security policies of the MRCS, 
‘‘Eagles’’, and the Malawian government.  
The first chapter of this thesis provides deeper understanding of the relevant concepts 
and literature for this research and also discusses the methodology in more detail. The second 
chapter provides empirical evidence for food security in Malawi and the government’s 
approach. The third chapter provides empirical evidence for the relationship between the 
Malawian government and the MRCS. The fourth chapter focuses on the relationship between 
the Malawian government and the ‘Eagles’. The findings of the second, third and fourth 
chapter are compared and discussed in the fifth chapter. The last chapter concludes this 
research by reflecting back on the impact that the level of operation from an NGO has on the 
government-NGO relation in Malawi.  
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2. Theoretic framework and methodology 
This chapter firstly clarifies the concept of NGOs, different types of NGOs and the rise of 
NGOs at the end of the twentieth century. The debate on government-NGO relations is also 
discussed, from the proponents’ and the opponents’ perspectives. Furthermore, different 
models to assess government-NGO relations are discussed and compared to each other. This 
chapter ends with an elaborate methodology section that outlines the following chapters.  
 
2.1.Defining NGOs 
Defining NGOs is difficult, because of the large variety of organizations that are known as 
NGOs. Three features are generally seen as key elements of an NGO: they are non-state, non-
profit organizations that pursue the relief of poverty, distress and want (Jennings, 2015, p. 
323). NGOs are part of a larger group of voluntary, civil society organizations, such as labour 
unions or social movements. Civil society is “the space in which people mobilize to bargain, 
negotiate, or coerce other actors in order to advance and promote their interests” (Banks, 
Hulme & Edwards, 2015, p. 708). NGOs are civil society actors, because of their close ties 
with local communities and representation of civil society (Banks, Hulme & Edwards, 2015, 
p. 709).   
Because of the large variety of organizations that fit this definition, there are several ways 
to distinguish types of NGOs. One way is to distinguish NGOs by their key drivers. Jennings 
(2016, p. 323) states that the key drivers of NGOs are their underlying ethos, objectives and 
approach. The underlying ethos refers to the religious, secular or socio-political values that 
drive an NGO’s actions. Objectives are the actions of an NGO in relief, welfare or advocacy.  
The third driver of NGOs is their approach: service delivery, empowerment, the willingness 
to work with state actors or whether an NGO plans and manages its own interventions. 
Another way to distinguish NGOs is by their level of operation. NGOs can be large, 
international organizations working mostly across borders. They can also be national-based 
organizations that emerge and operate in a specific country. NGOs can be small-scale 
community based organizations that operate in their immediate surroundings (Bratton, 1989, 
p.571; Jennings, 2015, p. 324). The distinction of NGOs on their level of operation is 
consistent with the distinction between Northern and Southern NGOs.  
Northern NGOs originate from high-income Western countries, but operate in Southern 
countries. Southern NGOs, although these could be international as well, mostly refer to 
grass-root, local NGOs (Fowler, 2000, p. 640; Gooding, 2014, p. 5). The level of operation 
also reflects another distinction between NGOs: between intermediary and operational NGOs. 
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Intermediary NGOs are mostly international NGOs that do not directly operate themselves. 
They usually have local counterparts that implement programs, and mainly focus on service 
delivery (Banks, Hulme & Edwards, 2015, p. 709). Operational NGOs are NGOs that actually 
implement programs in the field. These are often local organisations, either counterparts of a 
larger international NGO or independent grassroots (Banks, Hulme & Edwards, 2015, p. 709). 
A third and often-used distinction of NGOs is between service delivery and advocacy. The 
service delivery function of NGOs refers to the provision of social services, such as health, 
education or food security. This often substitutes a state’s delivery of social services (Fowler, 
2000, p. 640; Malhotra, 2000, p. 659). NGOs’ advocacy function can be seen as their 
traditional role. Early NGOs had close ties with the communities and were inspired by 
spiritual calling, secular human compassion, political ideologies or people’s anger about 
particular topics (Fowler, 2000, p. 644). NGOs’ morality was based on the values of the civic 
societies from which they rooted (Fowler, 2000, p. 644). Nowadays advocacy functions 
usually refer to gathering and publicizing information, enhancing public participation, 
promoting new norms and creating and mobilizing networks (Karns, Mingst, & Stiles, 2015, 
p. 258). Although the distinction between service delivery and advocacy gave rise to a large 
debate in the literature of government-NGO relations, service delivery and advocacy are in 
practice not as separate as the literature suggests. A particular NGO can and very likely has to 
perform advocacy functions in order to effectively deliver services (Gooding, 2014, p. 5). 
 
2.2 The debate in government-NGO relations 
In the previous section, the debate in government-NGO relations was shortly mentioned. This 
section elaborates on this debate. Firstly, the rise of Northern and Southern NGOs will be 
discussed to set the scene. Then both lines of argumentation in the debate will be addressed in 
order to set up the framework for this research.  
 
The rise of Northern NGOs 
In the 1990s, NGOs became a common research topic, due to the explosive growth in 
numbers of NGOs after the 1970s (Karns, Mingst & Styles, 2015, p. 252). The first modern 
Northern NGOs emerged in the early twentieth century. These early NGOs reflected the civil 
society’s ethics and values, and acted in response to disasters and human suffering (Fowler, 
2000, p. 639). An example of such an NGO is the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC). Its special focus was on helping the wounded during the war, war prisoner rights and 
neutrality of medic personnel (Karns, Mingst & Stiles, 2015, p. 253). The role of NGOs 
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diminished between 1930 and 1945, mainly because of the economic crisis and rising security 
threats (Karns, Mingst & Stiles, 2015, p. 254). 
After World War II, in the context of decolonisation and the Bretton Wood institutions, 
international NGOs shifted their focus from projects led out of compassion for human 
suffering towards development. International NGOs started operating in Southern developing 
countries. In the 1970s this development project was deepened when NGOs started the 
provision of social services towards the poor and vulnerable (Fowler, 2000, pp. 639-640). In 
this period, Northern NGOs partnered with Southern NGOs in a common struggle out of 
solidarity. Northern NGOs were still very much concerned with civic groups (Fowler, 2000, 
p. 640). 
The neoliberal era had an enormous influence on NGOs and their ideology and behaviour. 
The main development policies during this era, also known as the ‘Washington Consensus’, 
entailed the privatization of state-owned corporations, reducing government expenditure and 
eliminating or reducing state subsidies. In practice the Bretton Woods institutions 
implemented these policies as ‘structural adjustment programmes’ (SAPs) (Greig, Hulme & 
Turner, 2007, p. 120). The introduction of privatization and the lesser role of states in 
development brought NGOs into the official aid mainstream (Fowler, 2000, p. 641). Donors 
mistrusted Southern governments and their ability to bring development and NGOs were 
presented as an alternative. It was claimed that NGOs could ‘fill the gaps’ left by 
governments in service delivery, but also broaden the development agenda because of their 
civil society roots and people-centred approach (Banks, Hulme & Edwards, 2014, p. 710).  
The introduction of official aid on international NGOs had several implications. Firstly, 
NGOs accepted official aid because it would lead to greater resources to help the most 
vulnerable. It was therefor highly desirable, and NGOs started competing with each other. 
Their own economic growth became a proxy for their performance, indicated by efficiency 
and effectiveness (Fowler, 2016, p. 572). NGOs also introduced business management 
techniques and started to professionalize their staff (Fowler, 2016, p. 572). Altogether, the 
introduction of official aid has led to a shift of focus from roots and connectedness with civil 
society towards service delivery and performance, because NGOs were held accountable by 
donors instead of civil society and professionalization entailed a decrease in representation 
and membership from civil society (Banks, Hulme & Edwards, 2015, p. 710).  
In the 1990s the development regime shifted away from neoliberal reforms and towards 
the reintroduction of governments in development and good governance principles. Northern 
NGOs managed to stay relevant in this context, by successfully emphasizing their civic 
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society roles and countervailing power towards government (Banks, Hulme & Edwards, 2014, 
p. 708). In the current development regime, dominated by the Sustainable Development 
Goals, NGOs are formally institutionalized as partners in development (UN, 2018a).  
 
The rise of Southern NGOs 
Southern or local NGOs have developed substantially different than Northern NGOs. They 
originate from the colonial period, when social welfare provision was shared between the 
state and the voluntary sector. Voluntary organisations were responsible for education, health 
care and professional training (Jennings, 2015, p. 324). The colonial state accepted this shared 
responsibility and the voluntary sector was formally supported by the state. This shared 
responsibility between the state and the voluntary sector was to shape the post-colonial 
government-NGO relationship (Jennings, 2015, p. 325). 
 In the post-colonial era, Northern NGOs started to focus on African development. 
Because of the already existing relationship between African states and the voluntary sector, 
NGOs started to cooperate with the state on state-led development (Jennings, 2015, p. 327). In 
the 1980s the local NGO sector exploded, both in scale and in power. Similar to Northern 
NGOs, Southern NGOs dominated the domestic voluntary sector and were used by donors to 
bypass the state (Jennings, 2015, p. 328). The African state and Southern NGOs increasingly 
had to compete for official aid (Jennings, 2015, p. 329).  
 The state was reintroduced in development and good governance, poverty reduction 
and partnerships appeared on the agenda in the 1990s (Greig, Hulme & Turner, 2007, p. 129). 
Southern NGOs maintained their dominant position in the voluntary sector, mainly by 
emphasizing their role as civil society actors. Local NGOs nowadays are mainly concerned 
with the interests of the poor, by defending them and providing services. Southern NGOs 
seem to be eschewing politics more formally than ever (Jennings, 2015, p. 330). 
 
The debate in government-NGO relations 
What the previous sections have shown is that NGOs’ behaviour significantly changed during 
the Washington Consensus period. Northern NGOs shifted away from their civic society 
origins and towards market thinking. This led them to become a formally institutionalized 
government partner. Southern NGOs however side broke their long-standing tradition of 
shared responsibility with governments and, at least formally, stay out of politics.  
 The relationship between Northern NGOs and governments is a largely discussed 
topic in the literature. This normative debate addresses the question whether there should be a 
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relationship between NGOs and governments altogether. One side of the debate is based on 
an economic argument that originates from Weisbrod’s government failure theory. The 
argument made is that democratic governments only provide public goods that are 
advantageous for the majority. There are inevitably minority collective good demands that 
governments cannot foresee  (Salomon & Toepler, 2015, p. 2159). The voluntary sector 
complements these government failures perfectly by providing human services at a human 
scale, but fails to address public needs (Salomon & Toepler, 2015, p. 2159). The relationship 
between governments and NGOs therefor makes sense, since each sector’s strengths 
complement the other’s weaknesses perfectly (Salomon & Toepler, 2015, p. 2168). This 
argument is also made by the United Nations, that state that multi-stakeholder partnerships are 
an effective way of achieving the SDGs (UN, 2018a).  
 This line of argumentation is largely critiqued in the literature, because of the impact 
of official aid on NGO behaviour. Fowler (2011, p. 6) notes that NGO’s access to official aid 
is paired with official perspectives and requirements of Northern countries. This has led to 
increasing standardization of NGO practises and therefor undermines NGOs’ ability to 
provide alternatives in development, one of the main arguments to choose NGOs’ as 
development partners. Official aid has also had an impact on Northern and Southern NGO 
partnerships. Most official aid is provided to Northern NGOs, and their project-driven 
practices are than applied in the South without taking into account local context. These 
Northern-Southern “partnerships” increased Southern NGOs’ aid dependency (Fowler, 2011, 
p. 6). Malhotra (2000, p. 659) likewise argues that this resource transfer paradigm is 
unsustainable and has led to the predominant focus of NGOs on service delivery over 
advocacy. Banks, Hulme and Edwards (2014, p. 708) argue that Northern NGOs have not 
been able to make progress in the South because they lack the roots in society that Southern, 
membership-based NGOs have. This de-linkage with civil society is worsened by official aid, 
because it shifts accountability from civil society towards donors and governments (Banks, 
Hulme & Edwards, 2014, p. 709).  
 
In conclusion, the rise of NGOs was universal and applauded in the mainstream development 
regime. The promotion of partnerships between governments and NGOs has however not 
been uncriticized. The neoliberal policies that introduced official aid to NGOs undermine the 
civil society functions that legitimate NGO presence in development. This critique is mainly 
focused towards Northern NGOs, whereas it is argued that Southern NGOs still have their 
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roots in society. This distinction based on the level of operation forms the basis for this 
research. 
 
2.3 Models of NGO-government relations 
The previous sections have highlighted the dilemmas that both governments and NGOs face 
by interacting with each other. Although for some authors this leads to the conclusion that 
partnerships between governments and NGOs are undesirable (Fowler, 2000; Malhotra, 2000; 
Banks, Hulme & Edwards, 2014), it cannot be denied that there has been a trend of increasing 
partnerships between governments and NGOs (Najam, 2000, p. 381). The type of interaction 
between government and NGOs can vary greatly, depending on the specific context in a given 
situation. Why and how a specific relation evolves between government and NGOs is a 
broadly discussed topic in academic literature. This section provides an overview of relevant 
models to assess government-NGO relations. 
 
Different models of NGO-government relations 
Early typologies of NGO-government relations were mainly unilateral. They focused on the 
state’s willingness to cooperate with NGOs. Bratton argued that the presence of NGOs in a 
state showed the government’s weaknesses (1989, p. 572). NGO-government relations are 
therefor likely to be distrustful. NGO-government relations are best understood as political 
considerations of power (Bratton, 1989, p. 576). 
 Coston (1998, p. 362) built upon this assumption by stating that an asymmetrical 
power relation exists between governments and NGOs, which is more often dominated 
governments than by NGOs. Her model of government-NGO power relationships is a 
continuum, with eight possible types of relation: repression, rivalry, competition, contracting, 
third party government, cooperation, complementarity and collaboration (Coston, 1998, pp. 
361-362). These types of relationships are further specified with a list of indicators in order to 
assess the relationship between a specific NGO and a specific government on one particular 
program (Coston, 1998, p. 376). The relationships can thus vary across NGOs and 
government agencies within a country (Coston, 1998, p. 363). 
 Young (2000) diverges from this power-focused view of government-NGO relations.. 
Instead he argues that government-NGO relations depend on economic and social factors in a 
given context (p. 150). Young acknowledges that a relationship between governments and 
NGOs is a product of decisions made by both actors. It is also a multi-layered approach; 
meaning that in order to completely understand a relationship, all three typologies of the 
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model are, at least to some extend, likely to be present at a given time (Young, 2000, p. 150). 
His model consists of three typologies: supplementary, complementary or adversarial 
government-NGO relations. These typologies are essentially based on rational choice models 
in economic theory (Young, 2000, p. 151).  
 Najam (2000) developed a “Four C’s” model of government-NGO relations that is 
based on strategic institutional interests. The public sector, including the government, is 
mainly concerned with upholding the social order, by its legitimate authority and use of 
coercive sanctions (Najam, 2000, p. 378). NGOs’ most important strategic interest is the 
articulation and actualization of particular social visions of marginalized groups, by 
representing civil society (Najam, 2000, p. 378). NGOs are likely to be interested in the 
public sector, because of three reasons: NGOs try to perform public tasks the state has 
delegated to them; to perform public tasks the state is not able or willing to fulfil; or to 
influence state policies (Najam, 2000, p. 379). Like Young, Najam acknowledges that 
government-NGO relations result from both government and NGO decisions and behaviour. 
The model is based on two dichotomous variables: the preferred goals (ends) and the 
preferred strategies (means) for a policy. These strategies and goals of NGOs and 
governments can either be similar or dissimilar. They meet each other in the policy stream 
and this leads to a possible four outcomes: cooperation, co-optation, complementarity or 
confrontation (Najam, 2000, p. 383). The outcome depends on the crosscuts of similar or 
dissimilar strategies and goals.  
All of these government-NGO relation models highlight that these relations can be 
understood from different perspectives. Where Bratton (1989) and Coston (1998) assume that 
governments’ willingness to cooperate with NGOs dominate their relations. Young (2000) 
highlights the socio-economical aspects of such a relation. Najam (2000) assumes that it is the 
strategic institutional interest that helps understand relations between government and NGOs 
best.   
The goal of this research is to highlight the importance of the NGO’s level of origin in 
government-NGO relations. The difference in level of origins is expected to lead to different 
outcomes, because of the impact of official aid and the linkage with civil societies. It therefor 
refers to specific strategies and interests that are at play. With this goal in mind, the model of 
Coston (1998) is too unilateral. It focuses on power-relations and the government’s 
willingness to cooperate with the NGO. Young’s model (2000) would be a better fit than 
Coston’s, because of its bilateral characteristics. The downside of this model is however that 
it, like Coston’s model, inevitably restricts the research. Young’s model focuses on one 
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predetermined variable: the socio-economic context. Because the level of operations has not 
been adequately addressed in models of government-NGO relations before, a model that 
provides a broader understanding of these relations is a better fit. The model of Najam (2000) 
allows such a broad understanding, since it explains government-NGO relations through the 
strategic interests and perception of threat. Although the concept of strategic institutional 
interests is complex and broad, the model itself is simple and useable. In the next section this 
model will be further operationalized in the context of this research.  
 
2.4 Methodology 
After discussing the concepts, debates and models of government-NGO relations, this section 
outlines the methodology for the upcoming chapters. The research puzzle, question and 
hypotheses will be discussed in detail, before continuing with the empirical chapters. 
 
Research puzzle 
The critiques on government-NGO relations are based on the impact of official aid on NGOs 
and the distinction between Northern and Southern NGOs. Northern and Southern NGOs 
have evolved differently, seem to have different relations with the government and differ in 
their relation towards civil society. Whereas this is highlighted in the critical literature on 
government-NGO relations, the explanatory models of government-NGO relations have not 
paid attention to this.  
All of the government-NGO relation models are based on cases of Northern NGO-
government relations, such as United States, France, the United Kingdom Pakistan, Norway, 
Japan and some Latin American countries. Empirical evidence from government-NGO 
relations in the African context is scarce (Bawole & Hossain, 2015, p.2063). It is puzzling 
that so little research considers NGO-government relations in the African context, since the 
African continent is one of the NGO-densest areas in the world (NGO Aid Map, 2018). It is 
even more puzzling that the critique based on the level of operation has not been taken into 
consideration. 
 
Research goal 
The aim of this research is to highlight the importance of an NGO’s level of operation in the 
government-NGO relation. Thus far this distinction of NGO’s has had little attention in the 
explanatory models and empirical evidence for government-NGO relations, even though the 
critical literature suggests the level of operation is highly important for the type of 
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government-NGO relation. It seems especially important in the African context, since this is 
the most NGO-dense region in the world (NGO Aid Map, 2018). Both international and local 
NGOs are active in Africa. Malawi is host to more than 500 international and local NGOs, 
and the only SDG it has addressed so far is number 17: the multi-stakeholder partnerships 
(Swaney, 2016). The high NGO activity and the efforts that have already been made in terms 
of partnerships make the Malawian context especially interesting to answer the following 
research question: “How does the NGO’s level of operation affect the government-NGO 
relations in Malawi?” Two hypotheses, extracted from the critiques on government-NGO 
relations as mentioned earlier, will guide the following chapters: 
 
1. A Northern NGO is more likely to have a collaborative relationship with the 
Malawian government, because of the impact of official aid and its de-linkage with 
civil society. 
2. A Southern NGO is more likely to have a confrontational relationship with the 
Malawian government, because of its roots in civil society and the lesser impact of 
official aid.  
 
Methodology 
The explanatory character of the research question lends itself perfectly for a qualitative case 
study design (Bryman, 2012, p.71). In order to understand the effect of an NGO’s level of 
origin on the relationship between government and NGO better, this particular case study will 
be a comparative case study with a most similar systems design. In this research the cases are 
the MRCS and the ‘Eagles’ Relief and Development. This design allows studying the level of 
operation in government-NGO relations deeply and precisely by holding most variables 
constant, except for the level of operation. This will narrow down possible explanatory factors 
and helps to empirically check explanations found in this research (Hopkin, 2010, p. 292). 
The NGO’s level of operation, as conceptualized earlier, can be seen as a categorical variable: 
The level of operation is either in the NGO’s own country (Southern) or it is an international 
NGO operating in other countries (Northern). The NGOs selected for this research will differ 
in their level of origin, but are similar on the other classifications for NGOs: the underlying 
ethos, objectives and approach (Jennings, 2015, p. 323).  
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Case selection 
Malawi is one of the poorest countries in the world, with an HDI-score of 0.48 it is ranked 
170th out of 188 countries (UNDP, 2018). The country suffers from yearly flooding and 
drought seasons, which create a vicious circle of structural vulnerability that is hard to 
overcome (Misomali, 2008, p. 3). The government lacks sufficient resources and is highly 
reliant on foreign aid (Trading Economics, 2018).  This structural vulnerability is the reason 
that Malawi knows more than 500 active NGOs (Pensulo, 2015). It is one of the most NGO 
dense countries on the African continent.  
 The NGOs that will be compared in this research are the Malawian Red Cross Society 
(MRCS) and the ‘Eagles’ Relief and Development Programme (‘Eagles’). These cases are 
similar in their underlying ethos, objectives and approach. The underlying ethoses of both 
organizations are religious values. The MRCS is a national society of the International Red 
Cross Federation (IFRC), an organization that originates from Christian principles and moral 
(IFRC, 2018a). ‘Eagles’ is a religious organisation with roots in the Living Waters Church, a 
stereotypical Pentecostal church with Christian values (James, 2012, p. 883). The objectives 
of both organisations are relief and welfare, for example humanitarian aid, water provision 
and food security (‘Eagles’, 2018; IFRC, 2018b). Both of their approaches to these objectives 
are mainly through service delivery, but also focus on empowerment (‘Eagles’, 2018; IFRC, 
2018b). The ‘Eagles’ and the MRCS differ in their level of origins. As mentioned before, the 
MRCS is a national society of the IFRC, the largest humanitarian aid NGO in the world. It 
can therefor be considered as an international or Northern NGO. ‘Eagles’ is a local initiative 
from the Living Waters Church, and can therefor be categorized as a local or Southern NGO.  
The level of analysis to assess a government NGO-relation is a specific policy issue 
where both the NGO and the government have strategic interests (Najam, 2000, p. 383). For 
this research the policy issue is food insecurity. Food insecurity in Malawi is severe, complex 
and persistent. Nearly half of Malawi’s children suffer from stunting, half the population 
consumes insufficient micronutrients and almost three-quarters of the population have 
inadequate food intake (Devereux et al., 2006, p. 30). Food insecurity is a consequence of 
both natural and man-made hazards. Frequent and increasing floods and droughts lead to 
production shortfalls and fluctuating food prices. (Ellis & Manda, 2012, p. 1409) This is 
likely to worsen over time due to climate change (Stevens & Madani, 2016, p. 9). The fact 
that food insecurity in Malawi is so high on the agenda, for both governments and NGOs, and 
its linkages with disasters and development is the reason why food security is chosen as the 
level of analysis for this research.  
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Operationalization of the Four C’s Model 
In the Four C’s Model Najam assumes that both government and NGO pursue certain goals 
(ends) and prefers certain strategies (means). This goals and means can either be similar or 
dissimilar, resulting in one of the four possible types of government-NGO relations (Najam, 
2000, p. 383).  
Cooperation is a situation where the ends and goals of government and NGO are 
similar, and there is an absence of perceived threat (Najam, 2000, p. 384). In this case 
cooperative behaviour is likely. NGOs acting as public service contractors for governments 
are an example of this relation (Najam, 2000, p. 385). 
Confrontation is at the other end of the spectrum: in this relationship government’s 
and NGO’s ends and means are completely dissimilar. Both government and NGO feel 
threatened by each other and are likely to oppose the other’s policies (Najam, 2000, p. 386).        
Complementarity refers to a situation where government’s and NGO’s ends are 
similar, but they choose different means to achieve their ends. In this case it is still likely that 
they will cooperate and that it will eventually lead to similar means and therefor a cooperative 
relation. This is most common in the service delivery of NGOs, where the ends of 
government and NGO are similar but the NGO chooses its own means  (Najam, 2000, p. 387).  
Co-optation is the last possible type of relation and this is a situation where the means 
are similar, but the ends differ. This is likely to be a transitory state, because both government 
and NGO will try to change the other’s ends. These attempts rarely lead to cooperative 
behaviour, and are likely to result in confrontation (Najam, 2000, p. 389).  
 
 Goals (Ends) 
 
Preferred Strategies 
         (Means) 
 Similar Dissimilar 
Similar Cooperation Co-optation 
Dissimilar Complementarity Confrontation 
Table 1.The Four C’s model of government-NGO relations (Najam, 2000, p. 383). 
 
Now that the different types of relations are clear, the next step is the operationalization of the 
model. It is important to know what it means when the goals and strategies of government and 
NGO are similar or dissimilar. The goals of a government or NGO can be defined as the ideal 
outcome for a specific program. Ramanath and Ebrahim (2014, p. 23) have categorized 
strategies as “the NGO’s principal method to achieve the mission” and distinguish tactics 
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from strategies as “a set of actions that collectively help define and identify the strategies” 
(Ramanth & Ebrahim, 2014, p. 23). In order to assess the goals, strategies and tactics of the 
MRCS, ‘Eagles’ and the Malawian government in food security, I will be looking at the 
policy choices and concrete actions each institution has taken to achieve their goal. The main 
sources for this type of data are publications from the organisations, such as project rapports, 
official statements and newspaper articles. The timeframe for this research is relatively recent, 
from 2013 until now (2018). The reason that this timeframe is particularly interesting is that it 
includes the introduction of the Sustainable Development Goals, where both food security and 
multi-stakeholder partnerships are phrased as goals for development (United Nations, 2018b). 
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3. Food insecurity in Malawi: the government’s approach 
This chapter discusses the government’s food security policy. After introducing the policy, 
the specific policy goals, strategies and tactics are clarified. The goal, strategies and tactics 
form the basis to assess the relationship between the two MRCS, ‘Eagles’ and the Malawian 
government on food security. This chapter is therefor an essential first step to this research. 
  
3.1. The Malawian government and food insecurity 
The government plays an important part in managing food insecurity in Malawi. Although the 
increasing floods and droughts cannot be prevented, governmental policies could soften their 
impact (Stevens & Madani, 2016, p. 9). It is therefor not surprising that food security is high 
on both the Malawian government’s and numerous NGOs’ agendas. In 2013 the Malawian  
‘Office of the President and Cabinet’ (OPC), introduced the “National food and nutrition 
security policy”, including a strategic plan to guide food and nutrition policies for the next 
five years. The importance of food insecurity policies is made explicit by the president: 
“Improving the nutritional status of the people of Malawi is one of my Government’s top 
priorities” (OPC, 2013, p. i).  
The goal of this policy is: “to significantly improve the nutritional status of all 
Malawians, with special emphasis on vulnerable groups, but not limited to, expectant and 
lactating mothers, children below the age of 15 years, orphans, people with disabilities, the 
aged and people living with HIV and AIDS (OPC, 2013, p. 5), and more specifically: “to 
provide policy and technical guidance to policy makers and nutrition stakeholders in 
designing, development and implementation of nutrition programmes, projects and 
interventions that will effectively contribute to improved nutrition status of all Malawians and 
the country’s economic prosperity” (OPC, 2013, p. 14).  
The strategy to achieve the policy goal is divided into six policy statements, each of 
them including elaborate tactics on realizing the strategy. The specific goal, strategies and 
tactics are summarized in Table 1.  
 
Goal Strategies Tactics 
To significantly improve the 
nutritional status of all 
Malawians, with special 
emphasis on vulnerable 
groups 
1. Nutrition as key 
component of 
development agenda 
 
 
2. Create and sustain strong 
1. Budgetary allocation of 
resources, improving 
institutional capacity and 
to coordinate all nutrition 
programmes 
2. Government-partner 
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partnerships with 
stakeholders 
 
3. Standardise and improve 
nutrition quality 
 
 
4. Promote adoption of key 
nutrition practices 
 
 
 
 
 
5. The attainment of 
adequate nutrition 
 
6. Evidence-based nutrition 
programming 
committees and coalition, 
continuous stakeholder 
engagement 
3. Development and 
dissemination of 
‘National Nutritional 
Guidelines’ 
4. Nutrition education and 
communication 
committee, advocacy 
campaigns on nutrition 
and inclusion of nutrition 
in education and service 
delivery 
5. Informing and educating 
on food provision and 
advocating and lobbying 
6. Nutrition research and 
development committee, 
promotion and 
strengthening of nutrition 
research 
Table 2. Malawian government’s goals, strategies and tactics in food security 
 
Although the 6 strategies and corresponding tactics as formulated by the OPC address 
different aspects of the food insecurity policy, they all fit at least one of the following 
categories: inform and educate, advocate and lobby, and partnership- and resource-
management. Inform and educate is central in strategy four, five and six. “Nutrition education 
is critical for providing the caregivers, households, communities, service providers and 
stakeholders with the necessary knowledge and competences for improving human wellbeing 
and for reduction of nutrition disorders” (OPC, 2013, p. 22). “Frequently, malnutrition 
persists despite sufficient food availability. This is due to inappropriate food choices, 
combination and utilization for adequate intake of energy and other nutrients” (OPC, 2013, p. 
25). In the government’s policy, educating and informing people on nutrition and food 
choices is thus essential to increase food security and wellbeing. 
 The second category of strategies and tactics, advocate and lobby, is part of all six 
strategies. Advocacy and lobbying are targeted on stakeholders, service deliverers and 
community leaders. Examples of advocacy strategies are: “Hold advocacy campaigns on 
nutrition and dietetics to educate policy makers and the general population” (OPC, 2013, p. 
23). “Development of an advocacy tool for nutrition targeting various of people such as 
policy and decision makers in government and other relevant institutions and organizations” 
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(OPC, 2013 p. 31). The following quotes are examples of advocacy and lobbying  specifically 
related to resource allocation: “Effective lobbying and advocacy for support and resource 
allocation for nutrition service delivery within government and among partners” (OPC, 2013, 
p. 31).  “Lobby with the head of finance and other heads of sectors, national and district level, 
to allocate resources for nutrition” (OPC, 2013, p. 44). “…Government shall further advocate 
for and solicit financial resources through strengthening partnerships for nutrition” (OPC, 
2013, p. 16).  
 The last category of strategies and tactics, partnership- and resource-management, 
plays the most dominant role in strategies one, two and three. Partnerships and resource- 
management are mentioned in the following examples: “To guide and facilitate resource 
mobilization, project implementation, structural development and capacity building in 
relevant areas” (OPC, 2013, p.11). “The bilateral and multilateral partners will accord 
nutrition high priority on their support to government and in line with the MGDS in order to 
contribute to the operationalization of the government plans in national nutrition plans” (OPC, 
2013, p. 16). “Government will put in place resource mobilization mechanisms for nutrition 
through establishment of a government-partners committee on nutrition” (OPC, 2013, p. 17). 
“Development of a comprehensive Nutrition Business plan that clearly defines the key 
stakeholders, their key roles and responsibilities based on their mandate, area of focus and 
comparative advantage both in the public and private sectors (OPC, 2013, p.19). “Facilitate 
continuous engagement with multilateral and bilateral partners, the private sector and civil 
society, sharing of information, networking and feedback through stakeholders coordination 
meetings” (OPC, 2013, p. 20). “Lobby for training of a pool of technical experts in nutrition” 
(OPC, 2013, p. 46). All these quotations show that the aims to meet its policy needs by 
advocating and lobbying of stakeholders, whilst guiding and coordinating all food security 
partners.  
 
3.2. Conclusions of the government’s food security policy 
Although the “National food and nutrition security policy” is an elaborate document, 
including extensive strategies and tactics, the previous section has shown that they all fit the 
categories of inform and educate, advocate and lobby, and partnership- and resource-
management at least partly. Three particular observations are worth mentioning. Firstly, the 
government uses terms such as ‘advocating’ and ‘lobbying’. This terminology reminds more 
of an NGO or other civil society group than a government document. ‘Lobbying’ is defined 
as: “an organized attempt by members of the public to influence legislators” (Oxford 
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Dictionary, 2018). In this case it is the government rather than the public that is attempting to 
influence stakeholders, particularly on matters of resource allocation. This reflects the power 
relations between stakeholders, such as NGOs, and the government in Malawi. The 
government has to lobby for its interests, and depends on partnerships to achieve its policy 
goals.  
The importance of partnerships in this policy is another observation. Malawi’s 
government explicitly formulates partnerships as one of the means to improve the nutritional 
status of Malawi. As mentioned in the previous section, these partnerships are mentioned 
throughout the document in relation to resource allocation, bringing in expertise and service 
delivery. The Malawian government thus seems to have particular policy needs that it seems 
to fulfil by including partners. Partnerships with both private and civil society actors are thus 
in the strategic interest of the Malawian government.  
A final observation from this document is the absence of actual food provision 
policies. The plan entails provision of information and training on nutrition, but in no way 
addresses the problem of insufficient access to food. Although the government does not 
explicitly state this, the emphasis on partnerships and the need to ‘lobby’ with other 
stakeholders indicate that it lacks resources on all fronts, including food provision. The 
government presents itself as a ‘gatekeeper’ in food security. By coordinating networks 
between different stakeholders and allocating the resources they bring in, the government 
seems to aim for control and leadership in the fight against food insecurity in Malawi.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21 
 
4. Food insecurity in Malawi: the MRCS’s approach 
 
4.1. The MRCS as an organization  
The MRCS is one of the largest humanitarian organizations in Malawi with 32 divisions 
spread across the country and over 30.000 members (IFRC, 2017, p. 2). It was established 
after independence in 1968. Before 1968 the MRCS operated as a branch of the British Red 
Cross Society (Official Gazette, 1968, p. 1).  The MRCS is a national society of the IFRC, an 
umbrella organization of all national societies of the Red Cross worldwide. The IFRC itself is 
an intermediary NGO. The MRCS is the local and operational counterpart of the IFRC in 
Malawi, and therefor also dedicated to the fundamental principles of the IFRC: humanity, 
neutrality, impartiality, independence, voluntary service, unity and universality (IFRC, 
2018c). These are included in the IFRC’s four main objectives: promoting humanitarian 
values, disaster response, disaster preparedness and health and community care (IFRC, 
2018d). 
The MRCS also pursues these objectives in the Malawian context, mainly as a 
response to the frequent floods and droughts. Some exemplary programs of the MRCS are: 
health programs focused on HIV/AIDS- and malaria-prevention through training and 
education; relief programs after the floods including food, water and housing aid; advocacy-
based programmes focused on the promotion of self-reliance, fighting stigmas around 
diseases such as HIV/AIDS and preparing local communities for national elections (IFRC, 
2018e). The MRCS is thus a humanitarian organization that concerns itself with both service 
delivery and advocacy programs. The focus of this research will be on the MRCS’s food 
security programs, which will be discussed in more detail in the next section.  
 
4.2. The MRCS and food insecurity  
In 2011 the MRCS launched the ‘Integrated foods security program’, in line with the 
government’s food security strategy (IFRC, 2013, p. 2). The MRCS had already been 
implementing food security programs for over a decade, mainly focused on maize production 
and availability. The goal of this integrated foods security program is a broader, community-
based approach: “to improve food diversity, reduce malnutrition and increase income 
generation” (IFRC, 2013, p. 2). This goal is to be achieved by focusing on crop 
diversification, income-generating projects, animal husbandry and the promotion of small-
scale irrigation  (IFRC, 2013, p. 3).  Table 2 includes a summary of the goal, strategies and 
tactics to implement the integrated foods security program. 
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 The strategies to achieve this goal can be categorized into three categories: training 
and education, cash transfer programming and material goods provision. These strategies are 
reflected in several projects of the MRCS in the period between 2013 and 2018. The first 
strategy, training and educating, takes several forms. Communities are for example trained on 
hygiene and sanitation in the WASH program (IFRC, 2016, p. 11). Beneficiaries are also 
trained and educated in farming, varying from general farming techniques to production and 
entrepreneurship. Volunteers and staff are additionally trained on certain aspects of the 
projects, such as targeting or community assessments (IFRC, 2016, p. 2).  
 Cash-transfer programming (CTP) plays a large role in the MRCS’s food security 
program. CTP is humanitarian aid as sending money to targeted beneficiaries to address their 
immediate needs (Kantner & Opiyo, 2017, p. 15). The MRCS has been doing CTPs since 
2012 because it: “…meets the immediate food needs whilst the medium-term needs would be 
met through the provision of agricultural inputs to encourage increased production” (IFRC, 
2017, p. 1). Although most of the cash is used to cover food needs, it is also spend on health 
purposes, savings or school fees (Kantner & Opiyo, 2017, p. 15). More interestingly, CTP is 
also the preferred intervention of Malawi’s government. “In Malawi for example, the delivery 
of emergency aid through cash transfer is recommended in the National Emergency Response 
Plan” (Kantner & Opiyo, 2017, p. 16).  
 The final strategy of the MRCS in food security is the provision of material goods. 
The most distributed goods are seeds and fertilizers, aimed to increase food production. The 
MRCS also subsidizes agricultural products to increase production (IFRC, 2016, p. 1). 
Besides distributing goods directly linked to food production, the MRCS also installs 
boreholes and water points in affected areas. The goal of this intervention is to increase 
hygiene and sanitation habits, in order to decrease health-issues related to malnutrition 
(Kantner & Opiyo, 2017, p. 11).   
 
Goal Strategies Tactics 
A community-based 
approach to improve food 
diversity, reduce malnutrition 
and increase income 
generation 
1. Training and educating 
 
 
2. Cash transfer 
programming 
 
3. Material goods provision 
1. Training and education 
on hygiene, sanitation 
and farming  
2. Cash provision for basic 
needs, such as food, 
health and schooling 
3. Fertilizers, seeds, 
subsidies, water points 
and boreholes 
Table 3. MRCS’s goal, strategies and tactics in food security 
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4.3. The relationship between the MRCS and the Malawian government  
According to Najam’s Four C’s model, the relationship between the Malawian government 
and the MRCS depends on how similar or dissimilar their specific goals and strategies are on 
food security. The goals of the government and the MRCS have some similarities, but also 
differ on certain aspects. They are similar in the overall goal of improving the nutrition status 
of Malawians. Both institutions also make the linkage between improved food security and 
income generation, or economic prosperity.  
Their goals differ however in their emphasis on the chosen approach: the MRCS 
emphasized a community-based approach, whereas the government emphasizes to improve 
food security for all Malawians, with a specific focus on vulnerable groups. These different 
emphases are however in line with their institutional function. The MRCS, an NGO, 
legitimizes its actions by emphasizing the linkages with civil society and the focus on 
communities. The government on the other hand is accountable towards the country as a 
whole, and it seems only logical that this dissimilarity in their goals exists. Overall, the goals 
are, although formulated and emphasized differently, reasonably similar. 
 When looking at the strategies and tactics chosen by both institutions, more 
dissimilarities start to show. The government’s preferred strategies are focused on guide-
lining all nutritional programs within the country. This becomes clear when looking at its 
strategy to put nutrition high on the development agenda, to create partnerships between 
stakeholders, but also to standardise and promote certain aspects of nutrition. The MRCS on 
the other hand has chosen specific and practical strategies to achieve their goal in food 
security that can be applied directly into existing or new programs.  
 Although the goals of the MRCS and the Malawian government are very similar, their 
chosen strategies differ. This suggests that the relationship between this particular NGO and 
the government is complementary. With complementarity it is likely that the government and 
the NGO will move towards an arrangement to achieve their shared goal. This can be either 
formal or informal. This type of relation is very common in the service delivery arena 
(Najam, 2000, p. 387).   
 The reality of the relation between the MRCS and the Malawian government looks 
similar to Najam’s description of complementarity. The government has stated partnerships 
with NGOs as one of its strategies to improve the nutritional status. The MRCS on the other 
side accepts the auxiliary role the government had in mind for it in food security, focused 
mainly on service delivery (IFRC, 2017, p. 2). The mainly chosen strategy of the MRCS in 
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food security, CTPs, is even recommended by the government (Kantner & Opiyo, 2017, p. 
16). It will be interesting to see whether this relationship differs when looking at a local NGO 
in the next chapter.  
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5. Food insecurity in Malawi: the ‘Eagles’’ approach 
 
5.1. The ‘Eagles’ as an organization 
The ‘Eagles’ was an initiative of the Living Waters Church in Malawi as a response to the 
food crisis in 2002. The Living Waters Church is a Pentecostal Christian Church, which are 
often reserved in their social development efforts (James, 2012, p. 884). The leader of the 
Living Waters Church however decided to act on the on-going famine by initially distributing 
food. Due to the limited resources of the Church, it soon became clear that this interaction 
was not sustainable. The Church therefor started the ‘‘Eagles’ Relief and Development 
Program’, an alternative bottom-up approach independent from external funding (James, 
2012, p. 885).  
‘Eagles’ is an independent organisation, with its own legal status, but closely 
connected to the Living Waters Church. It is also linked to Tearfund, a Christian charity that 
is active in over 50 countries to help those affected most by poverty and disasters. Tearfund 
works with local partners, and promotes community-driven approaches (Tearfund, 2018b). 
‘Eagles’ is one of their partners in Malawi. Rather than distributing food, ‘Eagles’ empowers 
local church leaders to respond to crisis, even if they lack resources (Tearfund, 2018a). 
‘Eagles’’ interactions are based on Christian values, such as the responsibility to take care of 
the poor and ‘loving your neighbours as yourself’ (Tearfund, 2018a; James, 2012, p. 889). 
The organisation has formulated five values that are at the heart of their interventions: passion 
and commitment for the work; God’s leading and empowerment; Empowering and holistic 
development; Integrity and accountability; Love and respect without discrimination 
(Tearfund, 2018a).  
 The emphasis in ‘Eagles’’ interventions is on the communities and their ability to cope 
and respond to food security crises. Besides guiding and providing them with knowledge on 
food production or material goods, a large part of the program consists of advocating for the 
community’s needs amongst governments and other, international NGOs (James, 2012, p. 
888). Their strategies and tactics will be discussed in more detail in the following section.  
  
5.2. The ‘Eagles’ and food insecurity 
‘Eagles’ finds its organizational origins in food security, as it was created to respond to the 
food crisis in 2002. The organization is still deeply committed to food security, although its 
approach has become more holistic. Rather than focusing on food provision, ‘Eagles’ is now 
committed to broader development, based on the community’s needs (James, 2012, p. 889). 
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Its goal is: “to mobilise churches and communities to work together to achieve holistic 
change” (Tearfund, 2018a). Its vision is: “to work through existing church structures, so that 
every local church can work effectively with their community to healing to the land, restoring 
communities physically, spiritually, environmentally, emotionally and materially. Its purpose 
is to bring lasting change to the whole country from the bottom-up, rather than relying on 
outside interventions” (Tearfund, 2018a).  
 ‘Eagles’ has three main strategies to achieve this goal. The first is through mobilising 
and training church leaders all over the country. These trainings are focused on showing 
church leaders that they can start with what they have, waiting for God to provide and do not 
have to wait until external funding arrives (Tearfund, 2018a). More specifically, Eagle trains 
local church leaders to listen to the community and assess its needs, to set up basic action 
plans, and to network with other agencies, such as local governments or NGOs with 
knowledge and practical experience in the community. ‘Eagles’ however emphasizes that 
their work should be better than secular agencies: it should draw on their expertise, but 
“directed, guided and empowered by God” (Tearfund, 2018a).  
 The second strategy is to implement community-driven projects. With this strategy, 
church leaders approach communities to find out what their priorities are in food security and 
development. Each community therefor designs its own action plan and chooses 
interventions. Several communities chose to install community gardens with diverse and 
drought-resistant crops, other communities planted woodlots to counteract on floods and soil 
infertility (Tearfund, 2018a). ‘Eagles’ has also helped opening several community-based 
childcare centres, orphan care and home-based care for the sick (James, 2012, p. 887).  
 The last strategy of ‘Eagles’ is advocacy. Whilst the organization advocates certain 
food or health practices towards communities, such as conservation farming or the use of 
condoms against AIDS, it also steps up towards other agencies (James, 2012, p. 887). Pastors 
have on several occasions helped to set up community advocacy committees, comprised of 
church and local leaders. These committees make communities more aware of their rights, but 
also interact with local government officials. The minister of national resources, energy and 
environment said: “I am very grateful to ‘Eagles’ for this initiative. How I wish in every 
community, ‘Eagles’ would facilitate such type of committees so that meaningful 
development can be achieved. I believe this committee will provide checks and balances on 
how we are working as Government and even NGOs “(James, 2012, p. 889). More generally, 
‘Eagles’ was able to convince the government to start buying cotton at a reasonable price 
from farmers. ‘Eagles’ also pressures the government to fulfil other commitments, such as the 
27 
 
installation of community irrigation systems or the provision of pesticides (James, 2012, p. 
889).  
 
Goals Strategies Tactics 
To mobilise churches and 
communities to work 
together to achieve holistic 
change 
1. Mobilising and training 
local church leaders 
 
2. Community-driven 
projects 
 
 
3. Advocacy 
1. Training on community 
assessments, action plan 
design and networking 
2. Community gardens, 
community childcare 
centres, home-based 
health care 
3. Promoting practices 
towards communities, 
setting up community 
advocacy committees, 
advocating communities’ 
needs towards the 
government and large 
NGOs 
Table 4. The ‘Eagles’’ goal, strategies and tactics in food security 
 
5.3. The relationship between the ‘Eagles’ and the Malawian government 
The goals of ‘Eagles’ and the Malawian government in food security differ greatly: the 
government emphasizes an improvement of the nutritional status, whereas ‘Eagles’ focuses on 
the holistic change through collaboration between the church and communities. The goals 
imply a different approach: the government’s goal is formulated in a top-down way whereas 
the ‘Eagles’’ goal emphasizes the bottom-up approach. The goals of the government and the 
‘Eagles’ are however similar because they both link food insecurity to the broader 
development agenda. Overall, their goals can be seen as similar, but with fundamentally 
different approaches.  
 This difference in approach also becomes clear when looking at the strategies of both 
institutions. The government’s strategies are highly focused on educating, partnerships with 
private sector organisations and NGOs, the promotion of certain principles and informing on 
all aspects of food and nutrition. This approach entails the underlying assumption that a large 
portion of solving food insecurity in Malawi can be solved through teaching communities 
certain principles and practices. Moreover, partnerships with other stakeholders play on 
important role in this approach, because of their expertise and their resources. Communities’ 
input or ideas do not seem to play an important role in the government’s strategy. ‘Eagles’ 
strategies on the other side are focused on educating and training local church leaders on how 
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to engage with communities, and projects are based on the communities’ needs and priorities. 
The third strategy also puts the community at the centre, by advocating its needs towards 
governments and NGOs.  
 Fitting the relationship of the ‘Eagles’ and the Malawian government is more difficult 
than the relationship between the MRCS and the government. Their strategies differ greatly, 
due to fundamentally different approaches. The goals of both institutions also seem dissimilar, 
because they reflect these different approaches. At the same time their goals are similar in 
their linkage between food insecurity and development. The relationship between the ‘Eagles’ 
and the Malawian government can therefor be seen as a hybrid between complementarity and 
confrontation. The empirical evidence also suggests that the relationship shows characteristics 
from both types of relation. Complementarity, as mentioned before, is often seen in service 
delivery and is likely to lead towards an arrangement between the NGO and the government 
(Najam, 2000, p. 387). This shows for example through ‘Eagles’’ approach to liaise with 
government officials to draw from their experience with development, but also to identify the 
most vulnerable within a community (Tearfund, 2018). The government has also referred to 
‘Eagles’ as a valuable checks-and-balances institution on the government’s development 
efforts (James, 2012, p. 888). The arrangements thus seem to be that both institutions learn 
from each other’s experiences and are open for input.  
Confrontation on the other hand is a situation where the government and NGO feel 
threatened by the intentions and actions of each other (Najam, 2000, p. 386). When 
community interests are threatened, ‘Eagles’ will step up towards the government and 
increase the pressure. This was for example the case in 2012, when ‘Eagles’ was in conflict 
with the government over the promised installation of community irrigation systems and 
pesticides provision (James, 2012, p. 888). The government acted upon ‘Eagles’ advocacy 
efforts, and took no coercive actions towards ‘Eagles’. The relationship can neither be 
considered as fully confrontational, nor as fully complementary. It is a hybrid form, mainly 
because ‘Eagles’ acts as a “checker-and-balancer” and shows confrontational behaviour 
towards the government if necessary.  
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6. The effect of ‘level of operation’ on government-NGO relations in 
Malawi 
The assessment of both the MRCS’s and ‘Eagles’ relationship with the Malawian government 
have led to different outcomes. The relation between the MRCS and the government fitted 
well with the complementary type of Najam’s model. The relationship between the ‘Eagles’ 
and the government is a hybrid between complementarity and confrontation. The differences 
between these relationships are at the centre of this chapter. The differences between the 
MRCS and ‘Eagles’ and the governmental attitude are discussed, before concluding with the 
implications of the level of operation on the government-NGO relation.  
 
6.1. Differences between the MRCS and the ‘Eagles’ 
Although the MRCS and ‘Eagles’ are similar in certain aspects, they differ in their level of 
operations. This difference has several implications on the government-NGO relationship. 
The MRCS, a local operational unit from an international intermediary NGO, seemed to have 
a fundamentally different approach than the local, community-based organization ‘Eagles’. 
Both NGOs emphasize community-based approaches in their food insecurity goal, but this 
approach is not reflected equally in their strategies and tactics. Compared to ‘Eagles’, the 
MRCS is only marginally concerned with communities. The MRCS’s strategies and tactics 
are mainly focused on service delivery by training and education, CTPs or direct goods 
provision. ‘Eagles’ on the other hand puts communities at the centre of their strategies and 
tactics, and play an important advocacy role besides their service delivery functions. In an 
article of James (2012, p. 891), ‘Eagles’ stated that:  
 
International NGOs have difficulty funding what they regard as a truly empowering approach. 
International NGO systems fit more easily with funding projects with tangible inputs, 
predetermined timescales, and predictable results. In contrast, ‘Eagles’’ approach involves a 
small number of salaried facilitators to help churches run their own sustainable programmes. 
‘Eagles’ approach to development is more organic and community-led than most donor log-
frames will tolerate. 
 
This statement suggests that the MRCS is likely to have more difficulty to fund community-
driven projects because of their dependency on official aid. This highlights the argument 
made by Banks, Hulme and Edwards (2015, p. 708) that official aid has driven international 
NGOs towards service delivery projects and away from their roots in the local communities.  
Another difference between the MRCS and ‘Eagles’ is their attitude towards the 
government. The MRCS is one of the largest humanitarian organizations in Malawi, 
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accompanied with large amounts of official aid. Their projects are large-scale and therefor 
have to, at least partly, be in line with governmental policies. The Eagles on the other hand is 
a comparatively small organization, with limited resources. Its focus is on the community-
level. To become better development agents, ‘Eagles’ promotes drawing knowledge from 
local government officials. Towards the national government, Eagles attitude changes and is 
much more advocacy-based by providing the opportunity for communities to speak out.  
 
6.2. Differences in the governmental approach 
The Malawian government positions itself open towards NGOs and partnerships more 
generally. The explicit formulation of partnerships as a strategy in its food security policy 
highlights the government’s needs for resources, both financially and in terms of expertise. 
Partnerships are thus in the strategic interest of the government. The differing relationships 
with the MRCS and ‘Eagles’ however implied that not all partnerships are equal. The MRCS 
takes governmental policies and preferences into account, and adjusts its own policies 
accordingly. The overall institutional interest of the government is to maintain social order 
(Najam, 2000, p. 378). Assuring food security in Malawi is part of that interest, and by 
mobilizing resources the government can achieve this goal faster. The MRCS seems 
interested in partnerships with the government because it aims to fulfil services that the 
government cannot fulfil at the moment. These interests complement each other.  
‘Eagles’, being a community-based NGO, places communities at the heart of their 
work. Its main interest to interact with the government is to influence state policies in favour 
of their communities. It is not in their strategic interest to align with the government, 
especially if the government threatens community rights. The government on the other side 
also does not seem to have strategic interests in collaboration with ‘Eagles’. Although 
‘Eagles’ advocacy is appreciated, and referred to as providing meaningful checks and 
balances, the government does not seem to ambition a more extensive partnership with 
‘Eagles’. This makes sense, since the government’s strategic interest in partnerships is based 
on its lack of resources. ‘Eagles’ is not a large, officially funded NGO with substantial 
resources. It is interesting that, because of that, ‘Eagles’ can act as the ‘alternative’ in 
development that legitimates NGOs’ official funding in the first place.  
In conclusion, the strategic interests of the Malawian government, the MRCS and 
‘Eagles’ indeed explain the relationship between the institutions. What is more interesting is 
that these strategic interests align with the implications of the difference in the NGOs’ level of 
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operation. The next chapter will conclude this research by reflecting back on the research 
question and the implications on the findings.  
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7. Conclusion 
In the case of Malawi, the NGO’s level of operation affects the relationship with the 
government in different ways. Firstly, the level of operation has implications on the roots with 
civil society. ‘Eagles’, the local NGO, emphasized the community greatly and put the 
community in the centre of its projects. The MRCS on the other hand mentioned the 
community as well, but its strategies were much more focused on delivering services than on 
actively engaging with communities. The level of operation also reflects a difference in 
resources. As a local NGO, ‘Eagles’ has relatively little resources and explicitly states that 
they can operate without waiting for external funding. The MRCS on the other hand is a clear 
example of a Northern-Southern NGO partnership, where funding flows from its Northern 
counterparts to the Southern MRCS. The MRCS is therefor not only accountable to the 
community, but also to its donors. The amount of resources available to an NGO also 
mattered for the Malawian government’s interest in partnerships. The ‘Eagles’ became 
marginal partners in food security, whereas the MRCS plays a central role and is actively 
engaged with the government and food security planning. This research has thus found 
evidence both hypotheses. Moreover, it has shown that access to resources influences the 
government-NGO relations in Malawi greatly.  
In an aid-dependent country like Malawi the level of origins matters for the type of 
relation between NGOs and government. Officially funded international NGOs, such as the 
MRCS, incentivize partnerships with the government, whereas community-based 
organizations, such as ‘Eagles’ are left at the margins of food security policies. The trade-off 
between an NGO with roots in society and an international, donor-dependent NGO with 
financial resources has implications on the legitimacy of government-NGO partnerships.  The 
reason why NGOs where introduced as official partners in development in the first place, was 
because they provided an alternative in development because of their closeness to civil 
society. When discussing partnerships between governments and NGOs, the level of 
operation should therefor be considered.   
The findings of this research can however not be generalized because of the limited 
number of cases, and the exclusively Malawian context in this research. It seems plausible 
that the findings could also matter for other aid dependent countries, or in other NGO-
government relationships. Further research is necessary to understand how the level of origins 
affects government-NGO relations more generally. Suggestions for further research are the 
comparison of different countries, for example by comparing the Malawian case to a case that 
is less open to partnerships. It would also be insightful to look at a broader range of NGOs, or 
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at different policy topics. Although the contributions of this research were small, they indicate 
that in an aid-dependent context access to resources incentivizes collaborative relationships 
between officially funded NGOs, whereas community-based NGOs are left at the margins. In 
an aid-dependent context government-NGO partnerships seem to be a necessary evil, rather 
than perfectly logic. 
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